CBP Seeks Comment on ANPRM Regarding New Requirements to Provide Greater Visibility into the Supply Chain of Goods Imported into the United States

On September 2, 2026, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) published an important and consequential advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) stating that it “is considering amending its regulations to give CBP greater visibility into the supply chains of goods imported into the United States.” 91 Fed. Reg. 56408. CBP seeks comments on new requirements that it claims will enhance visibility into the parties involved in the importation of goods, integrate innovative technical solutions for the tracing of supply chains of those goods, and collect foreign export documentation that foreign exporters are required to submit to the foreign customs authority prior to the exportation of those goods to the United States. New requirements could also significantly impact and complicate the import of products, including chemicals. CBP states that with these proposals, it seeks to detect and interdict illicit importations more effectively, “especially those that are illegally transshipped to evade compliance with U.S. customs and trade laws.” Comments are due December 1, 2026.

June 2026 Executive Order Intends to Strengthen Customs Enforcement

Executive Order (EO) 14411, “Strengthening Customs Enforcement,” signed on June 3, 2026, calls for the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) to take steps to establish heightened import disclosure and certification requirements consistent with the policy of the EO. The heightened requirements include providing detailed information about the imported good’s supply chain and production methods, such as the manufacturer’s product identifier (e.g., model or style number) or key specifications (e.g., composition, grade, or size). The EO also directs the Secretary to take steps to establish a requirement mandating the submission of any documentation or information that the foreign exporter was required to submit to the foreign customs administration prior to exporting to the United States. The EO directs CBP to leverage the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) program to strengthen customs enforcement.

ANPRM Proposals for Bolstering Supply Chain Visibility

In the ANPRM, CBP describes proposals for implementing the EO. Each proposal is followed by questions as to which CBP seeks more information. CBP states that it will use the comments received to draft a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that would propose regulations to implement these proposals or other proposals suggested in response to the ANPRM. According to CBP, “the most useful comments are those that answer not only the specific questions posed in this notice, but also provide reasons and data in support of any views provided by the commenter, describe current practices and technology in use to address issues of supply chain visibility, and address how the proposals outlined in this ANPRM would affect them, their company, and their clientele.” For each proposal, CBP asks stakeholders to consider whether the new requirements should be phased in by entry type, commodity (including whether special consideration is warranted for critical medical products and their key inputs), country, or mode of transportation; whether different implementation timelines should apply to small entities, foreign importers, CTPAT participants, or high-volume filers; whether any of the proposals are suited to voluntary test programs; and what implementation period would be necessary for affected parties to comply with the proposal.

CBP states that it is also interested in receiving comments that describe what respondents believe the effect the proposals would have on compliance with existing legal and regulatory requirements for importation. In addition, CBP is interested in the potential costs and benefits related to these proposals. For all numerical and quantitative responses, CBP asks commentors to provide sufficient information to recreate those calculations. Finally, CBP asks that respondents refer to the specific question number(s) being addressed.

Foreign Export Documentation for Imported Goods

CBP states that it is considering whether foreign export documentation may be helpful to verify and reconcile entry and entry summary information and to detect discrepancies that could indicate violations of U.S. customs and trade laws, such as dual-invoicing. According to CBP, such foreign export documentation may include that submitted to a foreign customs authority by the entity responsible for filing the export declaration (e.g., a trading company, distributor, consolidator, or third-party logistics provider) for goods destined to the United States. Foreign export documentation may include:

• Export declarations made by the foreign exporter to the foreign customs authority. This may show declared value, classification, and quantity.

• Commercial invoices showing the transaction value declared to the foreign customs authority.

• Packing lists to verify the contents, weight, and packaging of the shipment.

• Certificates of origin submitted to the foreign customs authority substantiating the origin of the goods.

• Export licenses or permits required for the export of controlled, restricted, or dual-use goods.

• Transport documents (e.g., bill of lading, air waybill) that were required as part of the export manifest filing with the foreign customs authority.

CBP seeks information on the full breadth of such documentation, as well as when and how it should require the documentation be submitted.

1. Scope of Requirement for Foreign Export Documentation; Transmission, and Retention of Foreign Export Documentation

Q1. Should CBP require the importer of record to submit foreign export documentation for all goods imported into the United States? If so, what are the benefits for customs enforcement?

Q2. Under 19 U.S.C. Section 1508, importers are responsible for maintaining records related to their activities involving importation of goods. Should foreign export documentation be required to be transmitted to CBP as part of an entry or entry summary filing, or should foreign export documentation be a recordkeeping requirement?

Q3. Should CBP randomize requiring the submission of foreign export documentation, both to ensure compliance with any general records retention requirement and to assess the extent of non-compliance with other U.S. law? If so, how should randomization work?

Q4. Should the importer of record be the entity that is responsible for retaining and, when requested, furnishing these records to CBP? If it is not the importer of record, then who should it be?

Q5. If the importer of record is required to submit the records to CBP, is the duty of reasonable care an appropriate standard for the importer to assess and ensure the accuracy of the documentation before submitting it to CBP?

Q6. If there were a general requirement for importers of record to retain any documentation submitted to foreign customs or export authorities, are there certain exemptions that should be made to this general rule and what factors might CBP assess in a benefit-cost analysis?

Q7. What are the challenges for importers of record associated with obtaining and retaining any documentation submitted to foreign customs or export authorities? Do importers already retain such documentation, and if so, for what purpose?

Q8. To maximize revenue collection and protect U.S. national security while minimizing compliance burdens (to the extent practicable), for how long should the retention of all documentation given to foreign customs or export authorities be required?

Q9. Do any foreign governments have agencies that perform export functions that are not formal customs authorities? If so, should information from those foreign government entities also be subject to a requirement for foreign export documentation?

Q10. If there are any conceptual discrepancies between the nature of the price reported to a foreign customs authority for a good upon export and the nature of the price relevant to CBP’s assessment of duties on that good upon its importation into the United States, for customs and trade enforcement purposes, how could or should CBP interpret and potentially reconcile these differences?

Q11. What internal controls and reconciliation processes should importers implement to identify discrepancies between the information on foreign export documentation and the entry or entry summary filed with CBP? If discrepancies are identified, what documentation or evidence should the importer provide to justify the difference? For example, if the foreign export declaration lists a different value, quantity, or classification from that on the entry summary filed with CBP, how could the importer reconcile these differences?

Q12. How can the importer ensure that the foreign export documentation provided to CBP is the exact document submitted to the foreign customs administration, and has not been modified?

Q13. Should CBP seek to verify the authenticity of the foreign export data submitted to CBP with customs administrations in foreign countries?

Q14. Should there be different documentation requirements for importers who are CTPAT-validated?

Q15. What specific types of foreign export documentation (e.g., export declarations, export permits or licenses, export certifications, commercial invoices, certificates of origin) are most readily available and provide the most accurate data for verification purposes?

Q16. What is the current lead time required for importers to obtain foreign export documentation from their foreign suppliers?

Q17. How should CBP address foreign export documentation that is not in English? For example, should CBP also require data fields for specific information to be submitted in English, in addition to providing the accompanying underlying documentation in the foreign language?

Q18. What costs would be incurred if foreign export documentation had to be provided to CBP as part of entry or included as a recordkeeping requirement?

2. National Security Considerations

Q19. What are the challenges for importers if the Secretary (potentially in consultation with other U.S. government officials) is granted the authority to designate certain categories of imports as posing an unusually high or grave risk to the national security of the United States and, in such cases, require the submission of such foreign export documentation by the importer of record as a condition of entry?

Q20. For categories of imports posing an unusually high or grave risk to the national security of the United States, should CBP randomize the submission requirement or require it across the board for all imports designated as posing a grave risk to national security?

Q21. Are there certain categories of exports (at the product and/or country level) that, if imported, pose an exceptionally high or grave risk to the national security of the United States?

Q22. If the Secretary (or other relevant U.S. government officials) designates a certain product or set of products as posing an unusually high or grave risk to the national security of the United States, aside from information given to foreign customs or export authorities, what other information might help the Secretary identify and address the national security risks posed by the importation of these products?

Q23. Are there existing U.S. government lists or designations that the Secretary (or other relevant U.S. government officials) should or could cross-reference in identifying products that pose an unusually high or grave risk to the national security of the United States?

B. Parties Involved in the Manufacture, Production, Movement, and/or Exportation of Goods Imported into the United States

1. Manufacturer Identification Code

According to the ANPRM, importers of record provide a manufacturer or shipper identification code (MID) at the time of filing entry summary. The MID is derived from the name and address of the manufacturer or shipper, as specified on the commercial invoice, by applying a code constructed pursuant to instructions specified by CBP. CBP notes that although use of the MID is longstanding, it provides limited identifying information and does not always identify the actual party that may be of interest for enforcement purposes and is not always available to CBP early enough in the entry process to be useful. CBP states that, moreover, the MID is not always a consistent or unique number. For example, the MID is based upon the manufacturer or shipper name, address, and country of origin, and these can change over time and/or result in the same MID for multiple entities. CBP is interested in proposals to redefine or replace the MID.

Q24. Do importers or other parties use the MID for any business purposes? If so, what are they and how could the MID be enhanced to better serve those purposes?

Q25. Instead of a single MID, should CBP collect other information to identify the manufacturer, shipper, and exporter for each shipment of goods imported into the United States? If so, what alternate information should CBP collect? How would this benefit CBP and what benefits could also exist for importers as a result of providing this information? Would the submission of alternate information result in any costs for manufacturers, shippers, and exporters, and if so, what are the costs?

Q26. If CBP collects information to identify the manufacturer, shipper, and exporter, how should each of these parties be defined?

Q27. Should CBP collect information on the “producer,” rather than the manufacturer, to align with the definitions of producer/production found in 19 C.F.R. Part 102 and in trade agreements?

Q28. Should CBP continue to use the current formula for identification of the MID, or should actual identifying data, such as full company name and physical address or other business identifier, be provided to CBP with each shipment of imported goods?

Q29. When should the MID or other identifier be provided to CBP? Should CBP require that the MID be provided at both entry and entry summary? Should CBP require the MID to be included on the manifest?

Q30. What should be the consequences for importers who do not provide accurate MID data and/or data to identify the manufacturer, shipper, and exporter for each shipment of imported goods?

Q31. What parties are best positioned to identify the manufacturer, shipper, and exporter to CBP? Should other parties in the supply chain be permitted to provide such data directly to CBP?

Q32. Are there concerns related to confidentiality for MID data as they are collected today and/or if CBP were to collect data for the manufacturer, shipper, and exporter for each shipment of imported goods in the future? If so, what are those concerns and how should those concerns be addressed?

Q33. In addition to the manufacturer, shipper, and exporter, are there other parties or indicators that should be declared to CBP? For example, if an online marketplace facilitated the sale of the imported merchandise to a party in the United States, should that marketplace be identified and why?

Q34. Should CBP require the identification of the party to which the merchandise is ultimately intended to be delivered, who may not be the initial recipient or the consignee taking custody of the goods upon arrival in the United States?

Q35. Beyond identifying the parties in a transaction (manufacturer, shipper, etc.), what specific software platforms or service providers (e.g., vessel sharing agreements, LOGINK, or other booking platforms) do you or your supply chain partners use to transmit shipping instructions, book freight, or manage logistics data? Please specify at what stage of the shipping process these platforms are used.

Q36. For any logistics platforms used, particularly those required by an overseas supplier, carrier, or freight forwarder, what visibility do you have into the platform’s data privacy and security practices? Are you able to verify that your data are not being altered, shared with, or stored by unauthorized entities?

2. Global Business Identifiers

In recognition of the challenges associated with the MID, in 2022, CBP established a voluntary National Customs Automation Program Test of Global Business Identifiers (GBI) to evaluate the potential for a GBI to supplement or replace the MID. (87 Fed. Reg. 74157, Dec. 2, 2022.) CPB states that a GBI is a unique identifier issued by the private sector to help companies map and trace their supply chains. According to CPB, as initially conceptualized, the GBI test allowed importers of record and licensed customs brokers to transmit GBIs identifying the manufacturer, shipper, or seller with their entry. For purposes of the test, CBP defined these parties as:

• Manufacturer (or supplier) — The party that last manufactures, assembles, produces, or grows the goods or the party supplying the finished goods in the country from which the goods are leaving for the United States.

• Shipper — The party that enters into a contract for carriage with, and arranges for delivery of the goods to, a carrier or transport intermediary for transportation to the United States.

• Seller — The last known party by whom the goods are sold or agreed to be sold. If the goods are to be imported otherwise than in pursuance of a purchase, the owner of the goods must be provided.

Test participants could also elect to transmit GBIs identifying the exporter, distributor, or packager.

CBP states that the ongoing GBI test is intended to determine whether GBIs offer more pertinent information regarding the entities with which they are associated and their supply chains (e.g., legal ownership of businesses, specific business and global locations, and supply chain roles and functions). CBP seeks input on the GBI test in its current form and whether it should be modified.

Q37. The GBI test currently permits the transmission of four entity identifiers — the Data Universal Numbering System (D-U-N-S®), Global Location Number (GLN), Legal Entity Identifier (LEI), and Altana ID — with the entry data found on the electronic entry. Should GBIs be collected at entry or entry summary, or both?

Q38. How do businesses use GBIs in their operations? Which GBIs are best suited to supply chain visibility? Are there other entity identifiers that should be included in the GBI test?

Q39. How challenging is it for businesses to obtain and maintain a GBI? Which parties in the supply chain are likely to have a GBI, and which are unlikely to have a GBI?

Q40. Is it feasible for CBP to require the provision of a GBI to identify the manufacturer, shipper, and/or seller at entry? Why or why not?

Q41. Is it feasible for importers and/or their customs brokers to obtain and disclose to CBP entity-level foreign tax and global business identifiers for the manufacturer, shipper, and/or seller? If feasible, should these be disclosed to CBP prior to arrival, at entry, or both?

Q42. Rather than an entity-level identifier, is it more or less feasible for importers to obtain and disclose to CBP a single product-level identifier for each shipment that provides detailed information about the imported good’s supply chain and production methods, such as the manufacturer’s product identifier (e.g., model or style number) or key specifications (e.g., composition, grade, or size)?

Q43. Would requiring entry to be filed sooner benefit CBP in reviewing supply chain documentation, and determining the admissibility of merchandise sooner? How would an earlier filing deadline affect data availability or data accuracy? How would an earlier filing deadline affect broker and carrier operations? What costs would result from an earlier filing deadline for affected parties?

Q44. Should CBP verify the accuracy of the GBI data submitted by an importer against other data submitted to CBP by other parties (if applicable)? What measures could or should CBP take in the event that GBI data submitted by an importer do not comport with data submitted to CBP by other parties?

Q45. Would the identification of parties using GBI data enhance the integration of technical solutions for supply chain traceability, as discussed further below?

C. Innovative Technical Approaches for Supply Chain Tracing

CPB states that illegal transshipment, the practice of routing goods through a third country to obscure or misrepresent their true country of origin, deprives the U.S. government of lawful revenue and threatens U.S. economic security. To combat such evasion, CBP notes that it has intensified its enforcement efforts, including evaluating artificial intelligence (AI)-driven solutions for pinpointing illegal transshipment risk. According to the ANPRM, CBP seeks to leverage supply chain traceability solutions (which are widely employed by the private sector today) to make rapid and resource-efficient decisions about illegal transshipment before goods arrive at, or are released from, the U.S. border. It is also essential for CBP to encourage the private sector to incorporate awareness of national security issues and geopolitical risk into their supply chain decision-making.

1. Novel Supply Chain Tracing Solutions

Q46. What technologies does the private sector use to obtain visibility into supply chains and the production methods of goods imported into the United States? How does the private sector verify the accuracy of the supply chain data generated by these tools? How do these technologies protect proprietary business information?

Q47. To what extent should importers be responsible for using technological tools to provide CBP with visibility into supply chains and the production methods of goods imported into the United States? What are the costs associated with using technological tools for large and small businesses?

Q48. What is the role of AI in driving these technologies?

Q49. How can these technologies be integrated with existing trade data systems, including the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) and relevant Partner Government Agency data exchanges?

Q50. What technology is available to verify the origin of raw materials, and bridge the “visibility gap” between suppliers and raw material sources?

Q51. Are the available technologies scalable to suit both small businesses and large multinational corporations?

Q52. What kind of operational efficiencies would importers and other actors who provide supply chain data to CBP hope to achieve, and how?

Q53. What technologies currently exist to assign unique entity identifiers and tamper-proof credentials documenting the movement of goods? Are these technologies currently used by the private sector? How common is it for larger companies to use these technologies? How common is it for smaller companies to use these technologies?

Q54. Could technology be used to certify properly required entry data elements, such as the country of origin of imported goods?

Q55. What are the vulnerabilities associated with the use of data provided based on protocols pursuant to global interoperability standards? How can the vulnerabilities be detected and managed?

2. Expanding CTPAT Program Requirements and Benefits

CTPAT is a voluntary program designed to build cooperative relationships between government and business to strengthen and improve the security of the international supply chain. CBP states that it is interested in innovative supply chain tracing technologies that CTPAT partners can use to demonstrate the integrity of their supply chains, and their continuous execution of the minimum security criteria (MSC).

Q56. What supply chain traceability solutions do CTPAT trade partners use today to manage their supply chains?

Q57. Should all CTPAT partners be required to use enhanced supply chain tracing technologies? If this requirement should only apply to certain CTPAT Tiers, what criteria should be used to determine which ones?

Q58. Should CTPAT partners be required to make their supply chain tracing technology visible to CBP?

Q59. What benefits could be afforded to CTPAT partners who use supply chain tracing technology? What benefits could be afforded to CTPAT partners who share their supply chain visibility with CBP?

Q60. Should the CTPAT minimum security criteria be expanded to include requirements for cybersecurity and data integrity, including a prohibition on the use of covered logistics platforms identified as a security risk? What benefits could be afforded to CTPAT partners who demonstrate they exclusively use trusted data chain partners for their logistics operations?

Q61. If the CTPAT minimum security criteria were updated to restrict or prohibit the use of “covered logistics platforms” (e.g., LOGINK or other foreign-controlled systems identified as national security risks) by the CTPAT applicant or supply chain partners, what specific administrative, operational, or software-transition costs would your organization incur to achieve compliance? Please provide detailed estimates regarding capital expenditures, training, system integration, and any potential supply chain delays associated with migrating to certified secure alternatives.

Commentary

CBP is wasting no time in giving expression to EO 14411. Given the expansive goals of the EO and the extensive measures the EO contemplates implementing, there has been remarkably little attention focused on what the EO could mean for the chemical industry. The ANPRM illustrates the potentially disruptive nature of the measures under consideration and the critical need for comment on and engagement in this matter by the chemical industry.

The United States relies extensively on chemical imports to supply the needs of our domestic manufacturing base. According to some sources, the chemical import market brings in greater than $400 billion in chemical products. The most significant potential impacts resulting from implementation of the provisions in the EO and as envisioned in the issues identified in the ANPRM include greatly increased due diligence obligations for importers, enhanced documentation requirements and the consequences of inadequate documentation, greater visibility into country of origin, and the circumstances under which foreign importers may be required to use a CTPAT-validated and licensed customs broker. As stakeholders appreciate, CTPAT validation is not easy or quick. The EO also contemplates legislative measures, but to our knowledge, none has been offered.

Chemical stakeholders are urged to read and comment upon the ANPRM as the EO and the implementation measures outlined in the ANPRM suggest consequential changes that will significantly impact the import of chemicals into the United States. Comments are due December 1, 2026.